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Abstract
The paper investigates how diﬀerences in infrastructure quality
may aﬀect industrial location between countries. Employing a dual-
technology model, the main result of the paper is the somewhat sur-
prising conclusion that an improvement in a country’s infrastructure
may weaken its locational advantage and induce a firm to locate pro-
duction in a country with a less eﬃcient infrastructure.
1 Introduction
This main question I wish to address in the present paper is the following:
How may diﬀerences in the quality of national infrastructure aﬀect locational
choice? At first sight, the answer to this question seems obvious. Improved
national infrastructure reduces transaction costs and should increase the prof-
itability of investing in that location. Indeed, this is the result derived by
Martin and Rogers (1995); firms tend to agglomerate in countries with higher
quality infrastructure. They also find that the more developed is the inter-
national infrastructure that ties countries together the more responsive are
firms to diﬀerences in national transaction costs.
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Using a diﬀerent model framework, namely the dual-technology model
that is particularly appealing for analysing less advanced economies, I derive
quite diﬀerent results from those of Martin and Rogers.1 In particular, in the
present model an improvement in national infrastructure in one country is
likely to weaken the locational advantage of that country and make location
in a country with a less eﬃcient infrastructure more profitable. Second, an
improvement in international infrastructure is likely to make it even more
profitable to locate in the higher cost country. The paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 presents the model and section 3 the benchmark scenario.
Section 4 (to be written) contains comparative static analysis. Section 5
concludes.
2 The model
There are two regions in the model, A and B, which we shall generally
refer to as countries. There are two goods, 1 and 2, produced using labor
as the only input. There is no migration of workers between regions. The
two goods can be produced by means of two diﬀerent technologies. The
”traditional” technology, which we shall also refer to as lo-tech or informal
sector production, is characterized by constant returns to scale, and described
by the production function
XLi = L
L
i , (1)
whereXLi stands for lo-tech production of good i = 1, 2, and L
L
i represents
the labor input, superscript L indicating lo-tech. Alternatively, production
may take place using ”modern” technology, which we shall also refer to as
hi-tech or formal sector production. Production is here characterized by
increasing returns to scale, and described by
XHi = α
¡
LHi − F
¢
, α > 1 (2)
where superscript H stands for hi-tech and α is the marginal product of
labor in hi-tech production. The fixed cost F represents a capital investment
and/or a licensing fee, in case the firm is not the owner of the technology.
1I have elsewhere used the dual technology model, made popular by Murphy, Shleifer
and Vishny (1989), to study issues of economic geography, see Bjorvatn (1999, 2000).
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For each good there is at most one hi-tech supplier. The monopoly po-
sition of hi-tech firms can be due to patent laws, constraints in the credit
market, bureaucratic barriers to entry or large fixed costs relative to market
size. The hi-tech producer faces competition in its market from lo-tech pro-
duction, a sector characterized by no entry barriers and perfect competition.
Using wages in the lo-tech sector as numeraire, and equal to unity, given the
technology in (1) we know that the supply price in this sector also equals
unity.
Preferences for a representative consumer in country J = A,B are given
by the Cobb-Douglas utility function
UJ = C
β1
1JC
β2
2J , (3)
where CiJ is consumption of good i in country J , and βi is the budget
share of good i, where β1 + β2 = 1. With Cobb-Douglas preferences and
constant marginal cost, the optimal pricing strategy of the monopolist is to
match the supply price in the informal sector, thereby capturing the entire
market.
The limit pricing strategy can be explained as follows. Note first that
Cobb-Douglas preferences yield a unit-elastic demand curve. This implies
that marginal revenue equals zero. An unconstrained monopolist would
therefore raise the price without limit in order to save on production costs.
The monopolist is however operating in a contestible market, facing a threat
of entry from lo-tech producers, with a supply price of unity. Charging a
price above unity would attract a large number of small-scale producers,
making such a pricing policy unprofitable for the hi-tech producer. In other
words, the threat of entry by small-scale producers defines a price ceiling
for the monopolists. Charging a price below unity would not be profitable,
since increased output only increases costs. Hence, the hi-tech producer al-
ways chooses a price equal to unity. The equilibrium demand for good i in
country J is therefore given by
CiJ = βiYJ , (4)
where YJ is aggregate disposable income in country J . Disposable income
consists of labor income and (a share of the) profits generated in the country.
As noted above, employment in the traditional sector yields an income of
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unity. Employers in the modern sector are assumed to match this wage of
unity. Hence, regular labor income in country J is LJ .
Due to for instance foreign ownership of capital, the entire value added is
not necessarily spent locally. Let γJ ∈ (0, 1) define the share of value added
that stays in the country, the remainder being spent in another country than
the two considered here. We can think of γJ as reflecting the bargaining
strength of hi-tech labor: In addition to their regular wage of unity, the
hi-tech employees receive a wage bonus in proportion to the firm’s profits.
An alternative interpretation is to think of γJ as a capital income tax rate,
with the remaining after tax profits leaving the country (and also leaving the
model). Disposable income in country J can thus be expressed as
YJ = γJΠJ + LJ , (5)
where ΠJ denotes value added from a firm located in country J . In case
no hi-tech firm is located in the country, ΠJ = 0 and hence YJ = LJ .
The limit pricing strategy implies that as long as the hi-tech firm is prof-
itable, it supplies the entire demand for its product. Hence, CHiJ = CiJ and
LHiJ = LiJ . The value added of a firm i locating in country J and servicing
only that market is therefore given by
ΠiJ = CiJ − LiJ , (6)
and if servicing both markets by
Π∗iJ = CiJ + CiK − LiJ , J 6= K, (7)
where the asterisk in (7) indicates that the producer is also an exporter.
Transaction costs apply on both local and international sales. Since tradi-
tional production is constant returns to scale, cost minimization implies a
decentralized production structure, thus avoiding transaction costs.2 A hi-
tech firm, on the other hand, has increasing returns to scale technology. We
2We shall also abstract from international transaction costs for the lo-tech producers.
In economic terms, this assumption is reasonable if a number of these workers are located
close to the border and/or if transaction costs mainly consist on various taxes that are
typically not paid by the informal sector. Analytically, abstracting from transaction costs
in the constant returns to scale sector ensures that the price in equilibrium is the same
in both regions and equal to unity. This is a standard assumption in the literature on
economic geography.
4
assume that it is not profitable for any firm to have more than one plant in
any single country. With τ denoting per unit transaction cost, production
from the modern sector firm exceeds sales by a factor 1/ (1− τ ), so that
XHi =
CHi
1− τ , (8)
where CHi is the consumption of good i supplied by hi-tech producer
i. Note that the level of modern sector production required to satisfy any
given level of demand increases exponentially with τ . Therefore, aggregate
transaction costs, τXHi , also increase exponentially with τ . This feature of
the model has some importance for the results derived later.
Profitable sales requires that the price of unity exceeds the marginal cost
of supplying an extra consumption unit, which is the inverse of the marginal
product of labor in hi-tech production (α) corrected for trade costs (1− τ).
Hence, profitable sales requires3
πi > 0⇒ τ < α− 1
α
. (9)
Let τJ denote per unit transaction costs on sales in country J . Transac-
tion costs on local sales are related to the quality of national infrastructure,
which includes the quality of roads, railroads and telecommunication, bu-
reaucratic eﬃciency, etc. Let τ ∗J ≡ τ∗ + τJ denote per unit transaction costs
on sales from another market to country J . In addition to the costs related
to the distribution of the goods in J , these costs include costs related to
the quality of international infrastructure. Denoted by τ ∗, these costs are
determined by the quality of international harbors and airports, and the ad-
ministrative capacity and eﬃciency in trade-administration in the country of
origin and the country of destination.4
Note that with the formulation above, transaction costs associated with
exports to J are unaﬀected by the quality of national infrastructure in K.
3Using (2) and (8), profits can be expressed as Πi = CHi − LHi = XHi (1− τ) −¡
XHi /α+ F
¢
, and operating profits as πi = XHi (1− τ) −XHi /α. The condition πi > 0
results in (9).
4The reader should note an asymmetry between the present model and the one by
Martin and Rogers in the treatment of transaction costs. In the present paper, per unit
transaction costs on exports are always lower when selling to the country with the lower
national transaction costs. In the paper by Martin and Rogers, the quality of national
infrastructure is irrelevant in case of exports. In their formulation, then, per unit sales
costs on exports are therefore the same in both locations.
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One might argue that this is not very realistic. If, for instance, the large scale
producer is located as some distance from the port or the border, the quality
of the local road system would aﬀect the profitability of exports. However, as
will become clear in an extension to the model, the qualitative results do not
hinge on this particular assumption. Since it is instructive to treat national
and international infrastructure separately, we choose this formulation in the
basic version of the model. Using (2), (4), and (5), (6) can be expressed as5
ΠiJ = µJ
·
βiLJ
µ
1− 1
α (1− τJ)
¶
− F
¸
, (10)
and (7) as
Π∗iJ = µJ
·
βiLJ
µ
1− 1
α (1− τJ)
¶¸
+ (11)
µJ
·
βiLK
µ
1− 1
α (1− (τ∗ + τK))
¶
− F
¸
,
where
µJ ≡
α (1− τJ)
α (1− τJ) (1− γJβi) + γJβi
(12)
is the multiplier, linking income with demand and thereby value added
for a firm located in country J .
3 Analysis
We wish to study how a reduction in transaction costs in the present frame-
work aﬀects locational choice. Assume that initially the two countries are
identical and that transaction costs are such that the eﬀective market size is
too small to permit profitable large scale production. This can be thought
of as the pre-industrialization phase. We then let transaction costs in one
country (country A) go down, holding transaction costs in the other (country
B) constant. We consider entry of only one firm. This allows us to focus
on the way in which transaction costs aﬀects profits and hence locational
5See the Appendix A for the derivation.
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choice in large scale production. Allowing for entry of additional firms would
introduce such issues as agglomoration eﬀects and multiple equilibria to the
model. Such eﬀects are well understood from the literature on economic
geography, and will not be discussed here.
While it is possible to discuss locational choice using the general expres-
sion (10) and (11), such an analysis would involve extremely complicated
formulae that do not lend themselves easily to economic analysis. Instead,
we shall proceed by use of numerical examples. Let the benchmark scenario
be defined by the data in Table 1 below.
Table 1. Benchmark data
LA LB γA γB α βi τB F
1 1 0.25 0.25 2 0.5 0.35 0.15
With F = 0.15 we see from (10) that positive profits in autarky is con-
tingent on τJ < 0.35. Hence, given the initial situation of τA = τB = 0.35,
a large scale producer will only enter if there it can also make profits from
exports. Note that with α = 2, and given the initial level of national trans-
action costs, from (9) we know that profitable exports requires τ ∗ < 0.15.
Figure 1 illustrates the benchmark case. The vertical axis measures in-
ternational transaction costs and the horizontal axis measures country A
transaction costs. Region I is the area in which exports are profitable from
both countries, which is true for τ ∗ < 0.15. Region II is the area where only
exports fromB to A are profitable, i.e., where τ ∗ > 0.15 and τ∗+τA < 0.5. In
region III, exports are not profitable from either region, i.e., τ∗ + τA > 0.5.
On the PI-line, locating in A and B yields the same profits, given that ex-
ports are profitable from both regions, i.e., given that we are in area I.6
Below PI, country A is the more profitable location, and above it, locating
in country B is more profitable. On the PII-line, the firm is indiﬀerent be-
tween locating in A and B, given that exports are only profitable from B
to A, i.e., given that we are in region II. In region III there is autarky, in
which case it is always more profitable to locate in the region with the better
local infrastructure, which here means country A. The shaded area in Figure
1 shows the combinations of τ ∗ and τA for which locating in the higher cost
country B is more profitable.
Initially, we are at point a with two symmetric regions characterized by
τA = τB = 0.35. Moreover, since τ ∗ > 0.15, trade, and hence hi-tech entry, is
6See Appendix B for the derivation of the PI and PII-lines.
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not profitable. Let us first consider how a reduction in τA aﬀects locational
choice, holding τ∗ constant. Lowering national transaction costs in A and
moving to point b makes hi-tech production profitable in A. Since we are
in region III, exports is not profitable in either direction. Hence, at point
b, locating in B would result in negative profits for the firm. Moving to c
brings us to region II. Locating in B would now be feasible, since exports
to A is profitable. Since we are to the right of the PII line, however, it is
more profitable to locate in A. Clearly, at this point, export earnings are not
enough to compensate for the disadvantage of being located in the high-cost
country B. Moving to d brings us to the left of the PII line. At this point,
export earnings more than outweigh the disadvantage of being located in the
high-cost country. The firm therefore chooses to locate in B. This result can
be summarized as:
Proposition 1 A reduction in national transaction costs in the country with
the better infrastructure may induce a firm to locate in the higher cost country.
Intuitively, improving the national infrastructure in A not only increases
the profits of local production but also increases profitability of accessing that
market from abroad. The advantage of locating in the higher cost country B
is lower cost access to the local customers. In fact, in region II, the only way
of profitably servicing consumers in B is to locate production there. When
the transaction costs associated with exporting to A are reduced suﬃciently,
locating in B is the more profitable choice.
Let us now consider the eﬀect on location of a reduction in international
transaction costs, keeping τA constant. Starting in c, a reduction in τ∗
bringing us to e also leads to a relocation from A to B. The reason is
basically as we described when considering the move from c to d; the reduced
international transaction costs increases the accessibility of market A and
thus increases the profitability of locating in B. Moving from e to f brings
us to region I, in which exports are profitable in both directions. Since
consumers in B may now be served also fromA, one might perhaps think that
this would automatically induce location in A. However, as discussed earlier,
total transaction costs increase exponentially with per unit transaction costs.
Locating in A would add τ∗ to the already high local transaction costs of
servicing market B, leading to a large increase in total transaction costs.
Keeping transaction costs at a minimum therefore implies locating in B.
Moving to g we cross the PI-line, and here locating inA is the more profitable
8
0.1 0.2 0.3
A
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5


II
I
III
PII
PI
II
I
T
,,,,
,
,
,
abcd
e
f
g
Figure 1: Equilibrium location
choice. The reason is that moving from B to A adds very little, and in
the extreme case of τ∗ = 0, nothing, to total transaction costs. It is then
more profitable to locate in the lower cost country. This discussion can be
summarized as:
Proposition 2 Starting from a high (low) level of international transaction
costs, a reduction in these costs may induce a firm to locate in the higher
(lower) cost country.
4 Comparative statics
An increase in Li obviously increases the profitability of locating in that re-
gion. A symmetric increase in labor supply in the two regions makes location
in country A more likely. In Figure 1, the PI-line would shift upwards and
the PII-line downwards. Intuitively, the larger are the markets, the more
important it is to be located in the market with the lower transaction costs.
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An increase in α makes large scale production more profitable. Exports
are now profitable for a larger range of transaction costs, implying an upward
shift in the line separating region II and III, and, similarly, an upward shift
in the line separating region I and II. It can be shown that an increase in α
shifts both the PI and the PII-line upwards. This implies that locating in
region B becomes more likely when international transaction costs are rela-
tively high, and that A becomes the more likely location when international
transaction costs are low. Intuitively, an increase in α increases the markup
on each unit sold, thus making access to a larger market more important.
When international transaction costs are high, we know that locating in B is
the only way to service both markets (region II). An increase in α increases
the importance of this strategy. When τ∗ is low, however, exports are pos-
sible from both locations (region I). Since higher α means higher profits
and therefore larger sales, the importance of locating in the market with the
lower transaction costs increases.
A lower F , by shifting the PI-line upwards and the PII-line downwards,
increases the likelihood that A will be the preferred location. The reason is
basically that, as above, lower F means higher profits and therefore larger
sales, which in turn increases the importance of locating in the market with
the lower transaction costs.
5 Extension: On transaction costs
One might argue that the separation between national and international
transaction costs is artificial. Improving the quality of national international
in a country is likely to improve also the quality of international infras-
tructure, thus making exports from this country more profitable. Since the
quality of national infrastructure in B is taken as given, international trans-
action costs in this country (τB∗) are also held constant, and given by ξ.
Let international transaction costs in A be described by τA∗ = θτA, where
θ captures the degree to which a change in τA aﬀects the costs of exporting
from that country. International transaction costs can then be desribed by
τ∗ = τA∗ + τB∗ = ξ + θτA. (13)
Thus extending the benchmark scenario, it is straightforward to demon-
strate that as long as ξ < 0.31, i.e., the point where the PII-line intersects
the vertical axis, Proposition 1 holds for any θ > 0. Figure 1 illustrates the
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case of ξ = 0.1 and θ = 0.5, given by the T -line. In this specific example,
a reduction in τA leads to an equal reduction in τ ∗. Clearly, a reduction in
τA bringing us from a point on the T -line above the PII-line to a point on
the T -line below this line, would induce a change of location for the hi-tech
firm from A to B. Hence, as long as the relatively poor infrastructure in B
does not aﬀect its exporting potential too much, i.e., as long as ξ < 0.31,
improving country A’s infrastructure will eventually lead to a relocation of
production to the higher cost country, exactly as in the benchmark case.
6 Conclusion
The eﬀect of economic integration is a highly debated issue in both politi-
cal and academic circles. The most important question is perhaps whether
closer economic integration will promote balanced development or increased
inequalities between countries. Inspired by Martin and Rogers (1995), but
using a dual-technology model made popular by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny
(1991), the article focuses on transaction costs on two levels; national and
international.
The main result is that a reduction in national transaction costs in the
country with the more eﬃcient national infrastructure may induce a firm
to locate in a country with lower-quality infrastructure. This result should
be interpreted as saying that improved infrastructure in a more developed
country may increase the location advantage of neighbouring less developed
countries. Relative to the result derived by Martin and Rogers, this is good
news for countries with less developed infrastructure. Note that the result
should not be interpreted as saying that improved infrastructure will au-
tomatically lead to firms leaving that country. Agglomeration eﬀects may
reduce the likelihood of firms moving out of established industrial clusters
once they are established.
Reducing international transaction costs may or may not induce location
in the higher cost region. Starting from a high level of international trans-
action costs, a reduction in these costs is likely to lead to location in the
country with the poorer national infrastructure. Starting from a lower level
of international transaction costs, a reduction in these costs may make the
country with the better national infrastructure the more attractive location.
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Appendix A
Reformulating (2), we find that
LH1 =
XH1
α
+ F. (A1)
In the autarky case, a firm located in J only serves that market, so that
CHi = CiJ . Using this information together with (8), (A1) can be written as
LHi =
CiJ
α (1− τJ) + F. (A2)
Insert this expression into (6), and we get
ΠiJ = CiJ
µ
1− 1
α (1− τJ)
¶
− F. (A3)
Using (4) and (5), we can express this as
ΠiJ = βi (γJΠiJ + LJ)
µ
1− 1
α (1− τJ)
¶
− F, (A4)
which solving for ΠiJ results in (10). To arrive at (11), note that CHi =
CiJ + CiK, so that (A1) can be written as
LHi =
CiJ
α (1− τJ) +
CiK
α (1− (τ ∗ + τK)) + F. (A5)
Then, using the same procedure as above, we can easily derive (11).
Appendix B
The PII-line
Region II
ΠA =
2(1−τA)
2(1−τA)(1− 14( 12))+14( 12)
³
1
2
³
1− 1
2(1−τA)
´
− 3
20
´
Π∗B =
2(1− 720)
2(1− 720)(1− 14( 12))+ 14( 12)
µ
1
2
µ
1− 1
2(1− 720)
¶
+ 1
2
³
1− 1
2(1−(τ∗+τA))
´
− 3
20
¶
ΠA = Π
∗
B ⇒
τ ∗ = −436−781τA+280τ2A−1411+280τA ,
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which defines the PII-line
The PI-line
Region I
Π∗A =
2(1−τA)
2(1−τA)(1− 14( 12))+14( 12)
µ
1
2
³
1− 1
2(1−τA)
´
+ 1
2
µ
1− 1
2(1−(τ+ 720))
¶
− 3
20
¶
Π∗B as for Region II above
Π∗A = Π
∗
B ⇒
τ ∗ = −1
2
τA +
2771
3480
− 1
3480
p
(3027 600τ 2A − 8800 920τA + 7288 681),
which defines the PI-line
References
[1] Bjorvatn, K., 1999. ThirdWorld regional integration. European Economic
Review 43, 47- 64
[2] Bjorvatn, K., 2000. Urban infrastructure and industrialization. Journal
of Urban Economics 48, 205-218
[3] Martin, P., Rogers, C.A., 1995. Industrial location and public infrastruc-
ture. Journal of International Economics 39, 335-351
[4] Murphy, K.M., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1989. Industrialization and
the Big Push. Journal of Political Economy 97 5, 1003-1026
13
